IGERT Program in Evolutionary Modeling

Male status hierarchies are a human universal. Even in small-scale societies, where food- and labor-sharing is extensive and decision-making is typically based on consensus, significant status differentials exist beyond those due to age and sex alone. Understanding male status acquisition in small-scale societies is critical to understanding the evolution of men’s social and political strategies. Furthermore, the institutional change these societies experience with exposure to market economies offers valuable insight into transitions in socio-political complexity over human history.

One of axioms in the study of cooperation is preferential interaction among altruistic individuals; the higher level of preferential interaction, the greater the chances for the evolution and maintenance of altruism. Regardless of population structure, whether a metapopulation is subdivided into distinct and isolated subgroups or has ephemeral boundaries with high migration rate, preferential interaction is required for the evolution of altruism. The preferential interaction, however, is rarely tested directly.

For decades, collective action (CA) has been a topic of great interest and debate in the social sciences. Several theories have emerged to explain how CA can arise and be maintained in the face of incentives to free ride and other problems. Costly signaling theory is one framework that has contributed to this goal, particularly for cases in which there is both limited punishment of free-riders and a potential for reputation building.