Costly Signaling and the Evolution of Pilgrimage Centers

Insofar as participation in a religious system provides a form of reputation that facilitates interpersonal interactions among people who are otherwise strangers, this benefit is jeopardized by free-riders who are not true adherents to the moral and belief system of the religion. This presentation will build upon the work of Sosis, Neiman, and Boone by considering how the practice of pilgrimage is a costly signal of religious adherence, for pilgrims typically engage in a variety of costly behaviors that affirm their commitment to the religion while operating as a deterrent to cheaters. At the same time, the pilgrimage center itself is a separate but interrelated costly signal of power, as suggested earlier by Neiman and Boone, and I propose that both costly signals operate side-by-side to promote cooperation and differentiation simultaneously, qualities that mark many middle-range societies. Behavioral and archaeological expectations of the model are considered and evaluated using the 11th-century pilgrimage center of Chaco Canyon as a case study.